IS “SUPERIOR BARGAINING POWER” ENOUGH? THE LIMITS OF DOMESTIC LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AGAINST THE INFRASTRUCTURAL POWER OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS

Abstract

This thesis examines a central hypothesis: whether the concept of “superior bargaining power,” established by the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan “On Competition” (2023), is capable of preventing digital platforms in e-commerce from abusing their control over market access. To distinguish related manifestations of platform power, the author identifies and analyzes three dimensions of such power—data control, bargaining asymmetry, and infrastructural control—and compares the domestic legal framework with the preventive (ex ante) approach embodied in the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA). The findings suggest that the provision on superior bargaining power is effective in situations where a platform exerts pressure on an individual seller, but it is insufficient where a platform governs the market itself through algorithms and access conditions. Consequently, the thesis proposes incorporating a limited set of ex ante obligations into competition legislation, proportionate to the scale and needs of the national market.